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1. Cross-Border Migration in Latin America: Overview
What explains cross-border migration in Latin America? What accounts for the differences in
rates of emigration from Latin America compared with those from other sending regions such as Asia and
Africa? Why do cross-border migration rates vary so much across Latin America? This paper reports the
beginning of a project seeking answers to these questions.
Currently, Latin America has the highest emigration rate in the world (Figure 1), and the region
has risen to that position of prominence in four waves. The first wave involved small numbers leading
Iberian colonization, 500 years ago. The second wave was far bigger and it involved coerced black
Africans arriving in slave ships, especially during the 18
th century and early 19
th centuries before the
British navy intervened to shut that slave trade down. Slave destinations were mostly tropical, the
Caribbean and Brazil leading the way. The third wave involved ‘free’ European labor arriving during the
age of mass migration from about 1870 to 1940. European immigrant destinations were mostly Argentina,
Brazil and Venezuela. The fourth wave began after the 1960s, and it has been very different from what
preceded it in three dimensions. First, the past thirty or forty years have been ones of net emigration, not
net immigration. Second, these migrations have been constrained by restrictive policy in high-wage
destinations. Third, while intra-regional migration within Latin America has never been extensive, recent
evidence suggests the potential for much more. For example, the rise of world oil prices along with
explicit government policies favoring skilled workers pulled many Latin Americans to Venezuela, in
particular from Colombia and Chile. To take another example, Argentina has also attracted many Latin
American immigrants, mainly from the rest of the southern cone. During periods of good economic
performance, Argentina has become a southern magnet, effectively competing with the US for
immigrants in a region where distance diminishes the North American pull. What is common to both
examples, of course, is good economic performance relative to the US.
Although the US has never lost its importance as the principal destination for Latin American
emigrants, they have started to explore new options, such as Australia, Canada, Japan, and some3
European countries (Spain, Italy and the UK). In addition, adverse economic conditions in Latin America
and improved conditions in Europe contributed to some return migration on the part of descendants of
previous European immigrants.
1 A similar pattern has also emerged for Asian descendants. The fourth
wave continued through the 1990s and up to the present, and throughout Latin American emigrants have
increasingly favored the US as their prime destination. By 2000, more than 55 percent of all immigrants
in the US were Latin Americans, and about half of these were Mexicans.
2 This fact has led both
governments to discuss seriously how to manage more orderly migrations across their common border.
As we stated above, emigration out of the region has always characterized most of the cross-
border migration in Latin America. Cross-border migration within Latin America has always been
relatively modest, as Tables 1 and 2 confirm for the 1990s. To begin with, except for local migrant-
magnets like Argentina and Venezuela, low-wage Latin America has far smaller foreign-born population
shares than does the high-wage labor market up north: the foreign-born share for Canada and the US
combined is 8.9 percent; that for all of Latin America is only 1.4 percent; and that for Latin America less
Argentina and Venezuela is a tiny 0.6 percent. Tables 1 and 2 can be used in another way to document the
dominance of inter-Latin American cross-border migration relative to intra-Latin American cross-border
migration. Latin Americans living outside their country of birth, but in the Americas, are distributed as
79.1 percent in Canada and the US versus 20.9 percent in their home region.
In short, Latin American cross-border migration is dominated by movements to high-wage labor
markets in Canada and the US, not by movements to low-wage labor markets in the region itself. Unless
Latin America starts some significant economic ‘catch up’ on the US over the next few decades, cross-
border migration within Latin America in unlikely to rise in relative importance. Thus, the rest of this
paper will focus on emigration from Latin America, and on US immigration in particular.
                                                     
1 In Europe, the definition of immigrant depends on the nationality of the parents (for instance, a person born from two French parents
will be granted French citizenship, no matter where he or she was born), while in countries like the US and Canada, it depends on the
country where the person was born.
2  The IRCA legalization Act of 1986, which intended to regulated illegal immigration, contributed to this large increase of Mexicans in
the US.4
2. Who Emigrates from Latin America?
Table 3 presents the age structure of immigrants entering the US between 1997 and 2001. There
we  focus on Latin American (LA) immigrants and compare their age structure with that of the
populations in their countries of origin. The immigrants have been divided into three age groups: 0-14,
15-64 (a range representing the active adult population, which in turn could be used as a proxy for those
in the labor force), and 65 years and older. Table 3 suggests no significant difference between LA
immigrants and the rest of the world, showing that 76-77% of US immigrants fall into the 15-64 range.
Now compare the share of the LA immigrants adult with that of their sending country, 61%, implying that
LA immigrants entering the US were much more likely to be labor-market-oriented adults than was true
of their home populations, for a difference of more than 15 percentage points. This self-selection of labor-
force-oriented adults has been true of international migrations since the early 19
th century (Hatton and
Williamson 1998: pp. 11-12), and, although Table 3 does not document it, migrations have always self-
selected young adults (Williamson 2001). What is true of sending Latin America is also true of receiving
US: the US population aged 15-64 accounted for 66% of the total population. In short, Latin American
immigrants were much more likely to be adults active in the labor force than the populations they left or
joined. Thus, their migration clearly served to reduce labor supply in their home country and increase it in
the US. Finally, the fact that these immigrants tended to be adults (and probably young adults) suggests
that they were responding primarily to labor market forces, rather than to political instability or violence
at home. Immigrants fleeing political conditions at home tend to move as a family, while immigrants
responding to labor market signals are those of economically-active ages.
Having generalized about Latin American immigrants in the US, note the considerable range
within Latin America. Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Colombia, Nicaragua and Peru are among
the Latin American countries that sent immigrants with the highest adult shares. Perhaps more relevant,
however, is the difference between the adult share of immigrants and that of the sending country. Here,
the really large numbers are for Nicaragua (a huge 35.4% difference), El Salvador (23.1%), Guatemala5
(20.8%), Honduras (20.5%) and Haiti (18%). These five manifested especially strong self-selection of
adults. Those that had the weakest adult self-selection were Cuba and Mexico, both recording a 12.4%
difference between immigrant and home adult shares. We think that this difference is likely to be
explained by the combination of two events: first, whether a country’s emigration experience started early
or late (both Cuba and Mexico have the oldest US immigration experience stretching back to the 1950s
and 1960s); and second, the “family reunification effect” which became a part of US immigration policy
with the 1965 Act.
Table 4 compares the educational composition of Latin Americans living in the US with that of
the population in their countries of origin. The self-selection by skill appears to be even more dramatic
than by age. The table shows the percentage of adults over 25 years having secondary or tertiary
educational levels.
3 It is quite clear that Latin Americans living legally in the US have, on average,
considerably higher levels of education than is true for populations at home.
4 In particular, if we consider
the percentage of people having completed at most secondary education (first and third columns), those
shares for LA in the US are more than double (sometimes triple) those in the origin country. This pattern
holds even if we assume that secondary figures for the origin countries refer only to the highest level
attained (as opposed to completed), as in the fifth column.
5
While Latin American immigrants to the US are more educated and more likely to be
economically active than their compatriots left at home, they are less educated, on average, than the
Americans they join. To the extent that education helps predict income, the inference here is that Latin
American emigration creates earnings inequality at home and earnings inequality in the United States.
This evidence on educational attainments and age raises a relevant question: Does emigration
from Latin America reduce or increase poverty rates and inequality there? Immigrants into the United
States entered at the bottom of the urban income distribution before World War I (Hatton and Williamson
1998: Chps. 7-11) and the same seems to be true of Latin American immigrants today. But did they and
                                                     
3 Puerto Rico and Cuba were excluded from Table 4 due to unavailability of information from Barro-Lee.6
do they leave from the bottom of the income distribution in the sending regions? Based on this
educational attainment and age data, it looks like the answer is no.
6 Indeed, we would have been surprised
by any other answer since history tells us that world migration has always been financially constrained.
Whether legal or illegal, international migration is expensive, and really poor people can’t afford it.
Consider the case of Mexico, a country that supplied almost a third of US immigration in the 1990s.
Daniel Chiquiar and Gordon Hanson (2002) have recently shown the following: starting with the facts we
have seen in Table 4 -- Mexican immigrants are much less educated than the average United States
citizen, but they are more educated than the average Mexican -- Mexican immigrants living in the US
would have fallen mostly in the middle and upper portions of the Mexican wage distribution, not at the
bottom; and, thus, Mexican immigration has raised income inequality at home (Chiquiar and Hanson
2002: pp. 3-4). It does not seem to have reduced poverty rates in Mexico. We need to establish whether
these Mexican findings apply to the rest of Latin America.
We are aware that having lots of relatively skilled LA immigrants in the US seems to signal a
brain drain problem if these immigrants represent an important share of the skilled labor force in their
home country, if they remit at low rates, and if they never return. But if they remit at high rates, and/or
return and/or create business links with their home countries, a current brain drain might well turn in to a
future brain gain.
3. Explaining US Immigration by Source Country
Suppose we start with Table 5 where those born in Latin America but living in other world
regions is documented for the year 2000. While significant numbers are living in Europe, the
overwhelming majority (88 percent) are living in the United States. Thus, explaining emigration from
Latin America is largely a matter of explaining emigration to the United States. Table 6 reports flows of
                                                                                                                                                                          
4 We must note however that these numbers do not take into account that more than 50% of illegal immigrants in the US come from
Latin America (in particular from Mexico) and that this fact could influence some of these patterns.7
legal immigrants into the United States since 1971. The Latin American total rose two and a half times
between 1971-80 and 1991-2000, from 1.8 to 4.3 million. Although US immigration from all regions
increased markedly over these three decades, the numbers arriving from Latin America far exceed those
arriving from Europe and Africa. And while the numbers arriving from Latin America in the 1970s
exceeded those for Asia by only a small margin, by the 1990s they were bigger by about 70 percent.
Legal immigration is, of course, only part of the story. Estimates for the stock of illegal immigrants in the
United States (Table 7) show that these are even more concentrated among Latin Americans and that the
numbers doubled between 1990 and 2000.
Examining the determinants of US immigration rates from a variety of countries can shed light on
what drives emigration from Latin America as compared with other source regions. It also allows us to
see whether there are important differences between the factors that drive Latin American emigration and
those that operate in other parts of the world. Here we draw on our earlier research on the determinants of
US immigration.
7 Our database includes 81 source countries (for which explanatory variables can also be
documented), 22 of which are in Latin America, covering the 28 years from 1971 to 1998. These 81
source countries accounted for 82.5 percent of all US immigration during this period. The dependent
variable is the number of (legal) immigrants accepted into the United States who were born in some
sending country as a proportion of that country’s population. Since this rate is bounded at zero, we use the
log of the rate in our regressions. This paper uses random effects regressions, a method which exploits
both the cross-section and time-series variation in the data. The results appear in Table 8.
8
The first regression equation is estimated including all 81 source countries while the second
regression is estimated only for the 22 Latin American countries in the sample. We focus first on the
estimates for the complete, world 81-country sample. The explanatory variables are those suggested by
                                                                                                                                                                          
5 These educational self-selection patterns are less dramatic for tertiary educational achievement.
6 Borjas (1987) and the Roy model not withstanding.
7Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2002). That previous paper also describes in detail the sources of our data and the variables included in
the data base.
8For the Latin American sample (n=22) in Table 6, the Hausmann test statistic for the random effects model is 12.49, i.e. the RE model
passes the test comfortably.8
theories of migration, explained at greater length elsewhere (Clark, Hatton and Williamson, 2002; Hatton
and Williamson, 2002).
Relative income between the sending country and the US is, of course, central to the migration
decision and it is represented in Table 8 by the ratio of the source country purchasing-power-parity-
adjusted GDP per capita to that of the US. The coefficient is negative as expected and highly significant.
Furthermore, the coefficient implies that a ten percent rise in US income (the leader surging ahead), or a
ten percent fall in source country income (the follower falling behind), leads to a 15 percent rise in
immigration from that country. However, the migration decision also depends on the relative return to
skills, not just income differentials, and hence the income effect must be ‘deflated’ by relative skill levels.
Here we use the ratio of the number of years of education of those aged 15 and over in the source country
relative to the US, and, as expected, this variable has a negative impact on immigration. Holding income
constant, a rise in the source country’s average education level by 10 percent (equivalent to 0.55 years of
schooling averaged across all sending countries) reduces the immigration rate by 7 percent. We are not
asserting that more education diminishes emigration rates, but rather only that GDP per capita
differentials are explained in part by schooling differentials, and that this factor must be accommodated in
the analysis. If income differentials were instead documented by earnings differentials for individuals at
common levels of schooling, then we might well get different results on the schooling variable.
Migration theory also suggests that differences across countries in the return to skills will select
migrants from different parts of the skill distribution (Borjas, 1987, 1991), what has come to be called the
Roy model (Roy 1951). These Roy model effects are captured here by the ratio of the Gini coefficients, a
statistic describing the distribution of household income, source country relative to the US. If a sending
country has more inequality than the US (an unlikely case for most sending regions except Latin
America), then those at the top of the income distribution will have less incentive to emigrate, while those
at the bottom will have more. If instead a sending country has less inequality than the US, then those at
the bottom will have less incentive to immigrate, while those at the top will have more. If inequality is
similar in the source and destination, then, provided that the source has a higher average income, there is9
an incentive to emigrate throughout the income distribution. Thus, unless poverty constrains poor
potential immigrants from leaving the sending country, the immigration rate to the US should follow an
inverted U shaped function of relative inequality.
The results in Table 8 strongly support the Roy hypothesis, with the peak immigration rate
occurring at a ratio of 1.12, very close to the point where inequality in the destination and source country
are the same. We shall return to this finding below, since, in the Latin American case, it may need to be
reinterpreted in terms of the qualification in italics, namely, poverty is likely to constrain the emigration
of the very poor residing at the bottom of the income distribution in the sending country.
Unless return migration is very inexpensive,
9 the discounted present value attached to any long
distance move should be higher at younger ages since the returns are spread over a longer future working
life. Thus, source countries with larger cohorts of young people should generate more migrants and higher
emigration rates. In Table 8, the coefficient on the share of population aged 15-29 is positive as expected
but it is not significant, at least for the full 81 country sample. We have no explanation for this surprising
result, especially, as we shall see in a moment, given the opposite is true for Latin America alone. Most
observers also stress what has come to be called the ‘friends and relatives effect.’ An established stock of
previous migrants from the same source generates network effects that lower the costs and reduce the
risks of migration, and, through remittances by previous migrants, may even supply the initial investment
necessary to finance the move by new migrants. Table 8 documents this ‘friends and relatives effect’ by
using the stock of those residing in the US but born in the source country, per thousand of the source
population, lagged one period.
10 Since this effect is sometimes thought to be nonlinear, the squared term
is also included. The pattern of coefficients reported in Table 8 implies that the stock effect is most
powerful at low levels and that it diminishes as the stock increases. At the average stock/population ratio
in our data, the effect of raising the expatriate stock by 1000 is to generate an additional annual inflow
                                                     
9 Under these conditions, migrations are less likely to be permanent and are more likely to repeat.
10 The lag is introduced under the premise that the ‘friends and relatives’ effect has to be in place before the migrant makes the move.10
from the source country of about 10 immigrants per year. A very powerful influence indeed, implying
very strong historical persistence.
Other country characteristics also matter and a very important one is distance from the
destination. This gravity effect is measured in Table 8 by the great circle distance from Chicago in
thousands of miles. The coefficient indicates that an additional thousand miles between sending country
and the US reduces the immigration rate by 21 percent.
11 Whether the country is landlocked also has a
large negative effect, although it is not quite significant at conventional levels. Even more important is
whether the source country is English speaking, a factor which increases the number of immigrants from
the sending country almost three fold. Political upheavals and violence, the most important source of
which are civil wars, also have a significant effect, increasing the number of immigrants to the US by
about 22 percent.
Clearly, US immigration policy also matters in determining immigrant source and Table 8
accommodates this by a series of dummies. Prior to 1978 there were separate quotas for the Western
Hemisphere (chiefly Latin America) and the Eastern Hemisphere (the rest). The dummy for 1971-1978
reflects the merging of these two quotas into a worldwide quota in 1979. The effect from 1979 onwards
seems to have been positive, especially for the Eastern Hemisphere countries, despite some decrease in
the overall quota. The legalization of illegal immigrants (which is recorded as part of total immigration)
under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (effective 1988) is captured by a variable that
represents the estimated stock of illegal immigrants by source country in 1980. This IRCA influence is
applied only to the years 1989 to 1991 when the program was in effect.
12 This effect varies across
countries with the largest impact being on Mexico where the effect was to double the immigration rate in
those years. The dummy for 1992 to 1998 (for all source countries) is intended to reflect the expansion in
the immigration quota that took effect following the Immigration Act of 1990 (effective 1992). This
                                                     
11 The gravity effect can be seen in Figure 2 where the lowest emigration (or highest immigration) rates are for the southern cone
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay), farthest from the US. Of course, these temperate areas have always been relatively high-wage,
which also helps explain their high foreign-born population shares (Table 1).
12 The reason for using the estimated number of illegals in 1980 and not some later date is that legalization was offered to those who had
been living in the country since 1982 or longer.11
increased the number immigrants by 13 percent (as compared with the expansion of about 20 percent in
the quota).
Finally regional dummies are also included. Here the excluded region is Western Europe so that
the coefficients on the other regions reflect differences from that benchmark. For the most part, the
coefficients on these regional dummies are small, suggesting that the ‘fundamentals’ can by themselves
explain regional differences in US immigration rates. Notable exceptions are the very large negative
intercept for Africa and the fairly large positive intercept for the Middle East. Within the Americas, there
are large coefficients for the border states -- Canada and Mexico, and for the Caribbean. While these
reflect the effects of contiguity they also reflect the place in the US (Chicago) from which distance is
measured.
13
4. Explaining US Immigration from Latin America
As Figures 2-4 document, cross-border migration rates vary enormously in Latin America. What
accounts for that variance? Are the same fundamentals at work that we have isolated for the world at
large?
The second column in Table 8 reports estimates for the 22 Latin American countries alone. These
are remarkably similar to those in the first column for all 81 countries. Hence, it appears that in general
Latin American emigration to the United States is driven by the same forces as for US immigration as a
whole, although the forces themselves may, of course, be larger or smaller. However, there are some
differences in the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients that are worth stressing. The most notable
difference between Latin America and the rest is the large and now significant effect of the share of
population aged 15-29. This regional difference may be explained by the fact that long distance moves
from Asia and Africa may be more typically family affairs, an issue that future research needs to explore.
                                                     
13 If distance was measured from Los Angeles rather than from Chicago, for example, the intercept for Canada would become less
negative and the intercept for Mexico would become less positive, but that for the Caribbean would become even more positive.12
In any case, this result implies that an increase in the proportion of the population aged 15-29 from, say,
25 to 30 percent would increase the typical Latin American country’s US immigration rate by 20 percent.
Furthermore, the coefficients on income and schooling differences are larger for Latin America. Thus a
ten percent increase in US relative income increases immigration from the typical Latin American country
by 25 percent and a ten percent increase in US relative education reduces it by 11 percent, much bigger
effects than we saw for all sending regions combined.
The other coefficients are very similar to those estimated on the full set of countries with the
exception of the dummy for 1992-8 which is negative. This may reflect the effect of the increased
favorable weight given to skills in the 1990 Immigration Act or it may simply reflect an increasing
number of Latin Americans choosing an illegal entry into the US (Table 7).
Inequality effects are also more powerful for Latin America, but the maximum immigration rate,
where the Gini coefficient ratio is 1.26, still fairly close to one. This inverse U shape implies that
immigration to the US is lower from those Latin American countries that are very equal or very unequal
compared to the US, and higher for those in between (that is, most like the US). Note, however, that this
is not quite the same as saying that Latin American immigrants into the US came from middle income
groups. Consider the following possibility: Because Latin American income distributions are more
unequal than the US, migration should select from the bottom of the sending country’s distribution, that
is, it should be mostly the very poor who move. However, there is also the ‘poverty trap’ to consider.
First, the very poor are unlikely to have the resources necessary to invest in the long distance move to the
United States. Second, and in addition, roughly constant absolute costs of migration across prospective
migrants implies that these costs would be proportionately bigger the poorer the potential migrant. If
either or both of these ‘trap’ effects dominate, then higher poverty rates in the source country should serve
to diminish US immigration from that country. Thus, while the migration incentives may be very great for
those at the bottom of the distribution, poverty makes it impossible. At the top of the income distribution,
there may be no financial constraint on emigration, but there will also be far less incentive to move. Thus,
it may be those in the middle of the sending country’s distribution that actually emigrate. As we have13
seen, this is exactly what Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) have found for Mexico in the 1990s when US
immigrants came from the middle and top of the Mexican wage distribution. This issue is important, and
it must be resolved with more research if we want to know whether more liberal US immigration policy
will really serve to diminish poverty in Latin America.
5. Latin America and the ‘Sources’ of US Immigration
Latin American immigration into the United States far exceeds that of other regions. This
dominance largely reflects higher rates of Latin American immigration to the US as compared with other
source areas. As we have seen, there are also significant differences across countries. In order to explore
some of these differences, we use our estimated equations in Table 8 to decompose the observed
differences in log immigration rates into ‘sources’ emanating from differences in the fundamentals
driving immigration.
We first compare Latin America immigration rates to the US with those from other sending
regions using the parameter estimates from the first column of Table 8 for the full 81 countries. The first
row of Table 9 shows the average value of the log immigration rate from Latin America minus the
average value of the log immigration rate from Europe, Africa and Asia. This difference in average log
points is multiplied by 100, and it relates to the average over the 28 years from 1971 to 1998. On average,
Latin America has immigration rates to the US that are 171 log points higher than the average for Europe,
183 for Asia and 317 for Africa. Let us start the analysis with the European comparison.
A little less than a third of the log immigration rate difference between Latin America and Europe
(50.7 log points) is explained by lower per capita income in Latin America as compared with Europe.
Lower education levels in Latin America partly offset this effect. Inequality contributes very little
because, although Latin American inequality is higher and European inequality is lower than the US, the
former is closer to the US level and hence nearer to the maximum of the inverted U. Demographic
structure accounts for surprisingly little of the difference as does the immigrant stock. Most important14
among the other fundamentals which favor Latin America are distance, which accounts for 46 log points,
and a higher incidence of English speaking. By themselves, these two fundamentals explain more than a
third of the difference in European and Latin American immigration rates to the US.
Latin American immigration rates into the US are higher by a massive 317 log points than those
of the 14 African countries in our sample. Per capita income and schooling now have the reverse effect
since both are considerably lower in Africa than in Latin America. The most important variables
accounting for the difference in US immigration rates for these two regions are distance (positive) and
English speaking (negative). While most of the difference in average immigration remains unexplained by
the nine fundamentals included in the analysis, one excluded fundamental that is likely to have played a
powerful role is poverty. In contrast with Latin America, we know that Africans are highly mobile within
Africa (Hatton and Williamson, 2003). Thus, it may be that poverty levels are just too high to permit mass
migrations out of Africa over longer distances. The comparison with the 19 sampled Asian countries
(some of which are in the Middle East) is also interesting. With the exception of the immigrant stock, all
but one of the remaining fundamentals explain very little of the 183 log point difference between Latin
American and Asian immigration rates. Thus, these Asian countries are, on average, very similar to those
in Latin America. The higher Latin American immigration rates are largely due to one fundamental --
distance.
6. Comparisons Across Latin America
Table 10 searches for causes of the wide variance in US immigration rates across Latin America.
Much like Table 9, this one looks for the sources of the variance in the log immigration rate. These
sources are, once again, calculated using the second regression in Table 8 that applied to Latin American
countries only. The variable being explained is the deviation in the country immigration rate from the
Latin American (unweighted) average, again in log points. Thus, the Mexican immigration rate to the US
is higher by 81 log points than the Latin American average. Similarly, the fundamentals are calculated as15
country deviations from the Latin American average. For countries like Argentina, Barbados, Mexico,
Trinidad, Uruguay and Venezuela, per capita incomes that are quite a bit higher than the Latin American
average help diminish their immigration rates significantly. High relative schooling levels push up the
immigration rates significantly for countries such as Argentina, Barbados, Chile, Panama, Trinidad and
Uruguay. Except for Brazil and Honduras, where their income distributions are very unequal, relative
inequality contributes little to differences within Latin America.
Other fundamentals matter far more, and, once again, distance is certainly one of them. The large
positive effects for Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America contrast with the large negative effects
for countries further south such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.
Relatively large accumulated stocks of immigrants living in the US also help to push up immigration rates
for the small Caribbean countries. Thus, there is very strong historical persistence in Latin American
emigration to the US; countries with an immigrant past tend to have an immigrant present. But even these
large magnitudes are dwarfed by the massive effect of being English speaking as is true of Barbados,
Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana. It should be noted, however, that there are quite a few countries for which
these fundamentals only explain a modest part of the observed differences in immigration rates. To take
one small and one large country as examples, those nine fundamentals explain only 60 percent of the
Barbados 230.7 point deviation from the Latin American average and only 44 percent of the Brazil -352.9
point deviation. Other country-specific factors clearly matter, and ‘poverty traps’ may be part of that
missing explanation.
It is also worth asking how these immigration fundamentals contributed to changes in
immigration rates over the last thirty years, although we are prepared for large residuals given that the R
2
in Table 8 for the time series is so much lower than for the cross section. Table 11 offers the
decomposition, again based on the regression for the Latin American countries alone. Here we examine
contributions to the change in the immigration rate between 1971-1973 and 1996-1998 in log points times16
100.
14 For Mexico the effects of changes in schooling years and inequality relative to the US, as well as
increases in the young adult cohort and the immigrant stock, far exceed the actual rise in the immigration
rate. Thus, although there has been a substantial rise in emigration from Mexico to the US, based on the
fundamentals it should have been larger still. In other cases such as El Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru,
immigration to the US rose by far more than the fundamentals predict. While all three of these countries
have experienced political instability, our civil war measure (omitted in the table) cannot by itself explain
much of these long-term increases in immigration to the US. Still, rising civil conflict did contribute some
to rising US immigration rates for Columbia and Peru, and to falling rates for Guatemala.
While individual country experience differs from that predicted by the fundamentals, it is notable
that the majority of entries in Table 11 are positive. Thus, lagging income per capita growth relative to the
US was pushing up the immigration rate for 16 of the 22 countries. Furthermore, some of these lagging-
income effects were powerful, like for Argentina, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela and Trinidad.
Symmetrically, Chile’s good performance kept potential emigrants at home. On the other hand, education
levels increased relative to the US in 20 of the countries, led by Panama and Venezuela, and this added a
further push to northward migration. The effects of changing relative inequality, are mixed although they
are large for some countries such as Brazil, Honduras, Jamaica and Mexico. Where this effect is positive
(Brazil, Honduras and Mexico), this is chiefly because increasing inequality in the US has narrowed the
gap between the relatively unequal Latin American countries and the increasingly unequal United States.
The demographic effects are also mainly positive, since young adult shares rose in most of Latin America.
These demographic effects were fairly small in most countries, though they mattered a great deal in one
very important emigrating country, Mexico (accounting for 65 percent of the rise in the log immigration
rate). Finally there is that powerful contribution arising from the growth of the immigrant stock in the US,
particularly for the Caribbean and Central America. These migrant stock effects are actually the result of
fundamentals in the past which have contributed to present high immigration rates. High Latin American
immigration rates have been sustained over the decades in large part due to these migrant stock effects.
                                                     
14 Note that the table excludes the impact of changing US immigration policy.17
7. An Agenda
We think that there are a number of directions that work on Latin American cross-border
migration should go in the future. It seems to us that the first step should be to extend the analysis in this
paper to include the role of what we have called ‘poverty traps.’ If future successful development
improved the lot of the poor in Latin America, would that serve to increase or decrease the emigration
rate? If OECD policy became more friendly towards immigration – especially Latin American
immigration – would that serve to select poor or middle-income immigrants? Would it increase or reduce
inequality in the sending regions? The second step is to understand why cross-border migration within
Latin America is so small compared to migration out of the region. This appears to be much less true for
Africa and Asia, and we need to know why. Is it simply due to the closeness of a huge high-wage country,
the US? Finally, we need to sharpen our understanding of which forces have mattered most in raising the
Latin America emigration rate since the 1960s, especially the role of policy in the receiving regions. Over
the past two centuries, all emigrant countries have passed through similar life-cycles. Very poor countries
have very low emigration rates: high incentive to leave is constrained by poverty. As countries start
developing, these constraints are released and emigration rates soar. At some middle point when they
reach a more mature industrial status, emigration rates peak, falling thereafter. Where does Latin America
fit in this life-cycle? Will emigration to the US rise or fall over the next few decades? And what will be
the most important underlying forces at work? Can those forces be easily influenced by policy? We need
some answers, and a better understanding of the last few decades is likely to supply them.18
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Table 1
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
Latest available year (2) 1991 1992 1991 1992 1993 1990 1992 1993 1996 1990
Total population 32,615,528 6,420,792 146,825,475 13,348,401 33,109,840 9,648,189 4,152,588 22,048,356 3,163,763 18,105,265
Total foreign population (3) 1,605,871 59,807 767,780 114,597 106,162 73,179 187,372 52,725 92,378 1,024,121
as % of total pop. 4.92% 0.93% 0.52% 0.86% 0.32% 0.76% 4.51% 0.24% 2.92% 5.66%
Origin of foreign population
South America 801,813 38,485 114,471 63,043 61,194 50,657 163,152 20,848 51,891 626,530
Argentina .. 17,829 25,468 34,415 1,953 1,558 47,846 4,165 26,256 9,070
Bolivia 143,735 .. 15,694 7,729 390 424 766 3,216 376 1,936
Brazil 33,543 8,586 .. 4,610 1,383 903 107,452 2,523 13,521 4,223
Chile 218,217 3,909 20,437 .. 1,496 4,948 2,264 4,652 1,726 20,787
Colombia 2,638 529 2,076 1,666 .. 37,553 189 2,374 362 528,893
Ecuador 975 243 605 2,267 9,040 .. 72 1,801 235 23,370
Paraguay 251,130 955 19,018 683 137 90 .. 194 1,512 494
Peru 15,977 5,805 5,833 7,649 3,182 2,396 1,432 .. 528 27,748
Uruguay 133,653 327 22,141 1,599 316 406 3,029 399 .. 5,454
Venezuela 1,934 300 1,226 2,397 43,285 2,379 91 1,489 7,374 ..
Others (4) 11 2 1,973 28 12 0 11 35 1 4,555
North America 12,809 10,545 13,135 8,227 16,035 9,385 5,713 6,887 2,201 14,244
Canada 777 1,435 1,112 1,151 692 752 1,373 569 388 772
Mexico 2,277 6,607 660 827 1,465 612 2,974 723 362 2,756
United States 9,755 2,503 11,363 6,249 13,878 8,021 1,366 5,595 1,451 10,716
Central America 3,241 1,508 2,413 2,389 3,846 1,745 273 1,518 614 40,781
Costa Rica 451 83 357 448 452 313 45 215 41 1,494
Cuba 1,393 85 492 579 617 302 25 410 352 10,157
Dominican  R. 259 36 178 126 47 78 14 104 37 17,140
El Salvador 178 46 364 228 177 175 42 89 18 897
Guatemala 113 119 121 147 266 154 39 124 27 531
Haiti 73 5 141 37 64 22 13 15 2 1,593
Honduras 138 189 300 220 182 111 27 111 17 429
Jamaica 26 … 11 19 29 8 2 4 … 213
Nicaragua 142 54 329 168 307 161 24 135 36 2,033
Panama 367 75 981 366 1,680 409 36 280 75 1,216
Trinidad and Tobago 73 3 … 9 21 12 6 6 7 3,451
Others (5) 28 813 120 42 4 0 0 25 2 1,627
Total from the Americas 817,863 50,538 130,019 73,659 81,075 61,787 169,138 29,253 54,706 681,555
Source: Migración Internacional en América Latina: IMILA (Boletín Demográfico Nro 65, Enero 2000).
Notes: (1) Information on foreign population from Africa, Asia and Europe is not available from this source. (2) Latest available year correspond in general
to the latest census year. (3) From all over the world. (4) Includes French Guiana, Guyana and Suriname. (5) Includes Barbados and Belize.
South America: foreign population by origin and destination (1)
Destination: South American countries20
Table 2
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Nicaragua Panama Canada Mexico United States
Latest available year (2) 1984 1992 1994 1995 1990 1996 1990 1990
Total population 2,416,809 5,118,599 8,331,874 4,357,099 2,329,329 28,528,125 81,249,645 248,709,873
Total foreign population (3) 88,954 26,279 41,352 26,043 61,394 4,967,035 340,824 19,767,316
as % of total pop. 3.68% 0.51% 0.50% 0.60% 2.64% 17.41% 0.42% 7.95%
Origin of foreign population
South America 6,377 1,232 1,761 1,027 19,847 176,430 21,365 995,236
Argentina 697 140 277 147 567 11,740 4,635 77,986
Bolivia 189 40 85 38 208 2,335 1,329 29,043
Brazil 191 181 136 110 618 9,360 1,293 82,489
Chile 1,277 209 185 115 975 23,880 2,501 50,322
Colombia 1,678 212 476 237 13,644 9,465 4,964 286,124
Ecuador 318 85 119 78 1,381 9,635 861 143,314
Paraguay 39 20 9 10 37 5,045 160 4,776
Peru 1,016 135 266 176 1,740 15,240 2,973 144,199
Uruguay 201 66 68 … 144 5,710 1,097 18,211
Venezuela 748 142 140 116 476 5,410 1,533 35,214
Others (4) 23 2 0 0 57 78,610 19 123,558
North America 6,995 6,042 11,165 3,833 4,739 272,175 197,630 5,042,844
Canada 347 279 257 147 137 .. 3,011 744,830
Mexico 1,279 1,350 5,250 734 1,361 27,485 .. 4,298,014
United States 5,369 4,413 5,658 2,952 3,241 244,690 194,619 ..
Central America 66,837 16,739 24,500 18,473 17,535 319,965 64,629 2,926,973
Costa Rica .. 856 737 4,727 3,828 1,520 1,521 39,438
Cuba 3,485 46 192 711 3,191 3,100 2,979 736,971
Dominican  R. 134 21 82 52 1,440 4,560 520 347,858
El Salvador 8,748 .. 14,425 2,136 2,340 39,020 5,215 465,433
Guatemala 1,431 4,524 .. 900 367 13,270 46,005 225,739
Haiti 30 7 6 20 119 49,395 364 225,393
Honduras 1,574 8,666 4,634 9,473 623 3,575 1,997 108,923
Jamaica 454 1 14 31 920 115,800 69 334,140
Nicaragua 45,918 2,139 3,621 .. 4,447 8,545 2,566 168,659
Panama 4,794 308 245 351 .. 2,385 2,169 85,737
Trinidad and Tobago 18 2 11 24 63 62,020 15 115,710
Others (5) 251 169 533 48 197 16,775 1,209 72,972
Total from the Americas 80,209 24,013 37,426 23,333 42,121 768,570 283,624 8,965,053
Source: Migracion Internacional en America Latina: IMILA (Boletin Demografico Nro 65, enero 2000)
Notes: (1) Information on foreign population from Africa, Asia and Europe is not available from this source. (2) Latest available year correspond
to the latest census year. (3) From all over the world. (4) Includes French Guiana, Guyana and Suriname. (5) Includes Barbados and Belize.
Central and North America: foreign population by origin and destination (1)
Destination: Central America (selected countries) Destination: North America21
Table 3
             Age structure of LA immigrants in the US and at their countries of origin
A.- Latin American immigrants in the US, 1997-2001
Country of origin Total 0-14 years 15-64 years 65+ years
Immigrants (%) (%) (%)
Total Immigrants 4,019,198 18.5 76.6 4.6
Non-LA immigrants 2,438,571 18.3 76.8 4.5
Latin America imm. 1,580,977 18.8 76.2 4.8
Mexico 806,358 20.6 74.2 4.9
Cuba 113,628 14.3 81.5 4.1
Dom. Republic 104,153 19.8 77.4 2.6
El Salvador 101,015 10.3 82.2 7.2
Haiti 94,522 19.6 73.2 7.0
Jamaica 79,112 22.8 74.2 2.6
Colombia 66,034 16.4 78.7 4.7
Nicaragua 57,314 8.3 89.3 2.1
Peru 50,189 14.6 78.3 6.8
Guatemala 46,389 23.2 73.5 3.1
Ecuador 40,927 20.2 74.2 5.3
Honduras 14,079 21.0 75.0 3.9
Guyana 7,257 20.3 76.2 3.5
B.- Population at their countries of origin, 1997-2001
Country of origin Population 0-14 years 15-64 years 65+ years
(average per year) (%) (%) (%)
Latin America 235,074,770 34.5 61.0 4.5
Mexico 96,614,822 34.3 61.8 3.9
Cuba 11,151,800 21.6 69.1 9.3
Dom. Republic 8,237,522 34.0 61.7 4.3
El Salvador 6,155,148 35.9 59.1 4.9
Haiti 7,806,600 41.1 55.2 3.7
Jamaica 2,554,852 31.6 61.0 7.4
Colombia 41,543,894 33.1 62.2 4.8
Nicaragua 4,941,756 43.0 53.9 3.1
Peru 25,550,652 33.8 61.3 4.9
Guatemala 11,094,540 43.9 52.7 3.4
Ecuador 12,409,800 34.3 61.0 4.7
Honduras 6,256,368 42.2 54.5 3.4
Guyana 757,016 31.3 64.0 4.7
Source: constructed with information from Yearbooks of INS (1997-2002) and WDI (2003, the World Bank)22
Table 4
Table 5




















United States (a) 16,062,000
Total selected countries 18,308,287
Source: ECLAC, Globalización y Desarrollo, chapter 8. &
(a) INS, calculated from 2000 census
Stocks of Latin American emigrants, outside LA
 (Selected Countries, circa 2000)
Education of LA living in the US compared with origin countries' population, 2000
         LA living in the US Population in Countries of Origin
Countries of origin    Highest level completed    Highest level completed    Highest level attained
Secondary Tertiary Secondary Tertiary Secondary Tertiary
Latin America, Total 46.4 10.6 16.1 7.7 31.7 11.8
Mexico 44.0 6.9 19.9 6.6 40.3 11.3
Central & South America 47.0 17.4 15.4 8.1 29.8 12.2
Source: Constructed from Statistical Abstract of the US  (2002), and Barro-Lee data on education (2000).23
Table 6
Country of Origin 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 1997 1998 1999 2000
Latin America 1,813.8 3,460.6 4,319.2 348.9 288.2 304.1 384.6
Mexico 637.2 1653.3 2,251.4 146.9 131.6 147.6 173.9
Caribbean 759.8 892.7 996.1 105.3 75.5 71.7 88.2
   Cuba 276.8 159.2 180.8 33.6 17.4 14.1 20.8
   Dominican Republic 148.0 251.8 340.9 27.1 20.4 17.9 17.5
   Haiti 58.7 140.2 181.8 15.1 13.4 16.5 22.4
   Jamaica 142.0 213.8 173.5 17.8 15.1 14.7 16.0
   Trinidad & Tobago 61.8 39.5 63.3 6.4 4.9 4.3 6.7
Central America 132.4 458.7 531.8 43.8 35.7 43.2 66.4
   Costa Rica 12.1 15.5 na na na na na
   El Salvador 34.4 214.6 217.4 18.0 14.6 14.6 22.6
   Guatemala 25.6 87.9 103.1 7.8 7.8 7.3 10.0
   Honduras 17.2 49.5 66.7 7.6 6.5 4.8 5.9
   Nicaragua 13.0 44.1 97.7 6.3 3.5 13.4 24.0
   Panama 22.7 29.0 23.9 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.8
South America 284.4 455.9 539.9 52.9 45.4 41.6 56.1
   Argentina 25.1 25.7 24.3 2.0 1.5 1.4 2.3
   Brazil 13.7 23.7 52.3 4.6 4.4 3.9 7.0
   Chile 17.6 23.4 16.9 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.7
   Colombia 77.6 124.4 131.0 13.0 11.8 10.0 14.5
   Ecuador 50.2 56.0 76.4 7.8 6.9 8.9 7.7
   Guyana 47.5 95.4 73.8 na na 3.3 5.7
   Peru 29.1 64.4 105.7 10.9 10.2 8.4 9.6
   Venezuela 7.1 17.9 29.9 3.3 3.1 2.5 4.7
Europe 801.3 705.6 1,311.4 119.9 90.8 92.7 132.5
Asia 1,633.8 2,817.4 2,892.2 265.8 219.7 199.4 265.4
Canada 114.8 119.2 137.6 11.6 10.2 8.9 16.2
Africa 91.5 192.3 383.0 47.8 40.7 36.7 44.7
Oceania na na 48.0 na na 3.7 5.1
All Countries 4,493.3 7,338.1 9,095.4 798.4 660.5 646.6 849.8
Source: US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years.
Latin American immigrants to the USA, by country of birth
(thousands)24
Table 7
Country of Origin 1990 2000 Increase
(percent)
Latin America (selected countries) 2,746 5,833 212
Mexico 2,040 4,808 236
El Salvador 298 189 63
Guatemala 118 144 122
Colombia 51 141 276
Honduras 42 138 329
Ecuador 37 108 292
Dominican Republic 46 91 198
     Brazil 20 77 385
Haiti 67 76 113
Peru 27 61 226
All other countries 754 1167 155
China 70 115 164
Philippines 70.0 85 121
India 28 70 250
Korea 24 55 229
Canada 25 47 188
All Countries 3,500 7,000 200
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service (2000)
Previous estimates for 1996, indicated 50,000 illegal immigrants from Jamaica,
50,000 from Trinidad & Tobago and 70,000 from Nicaragua.
Estimates of undocumented LA immigrants to the USA,
1990-200025
Table 8
Immigration to the United States, 1971-1998





Coeff. z-stat. Coeff z-stat.
Constant -8.72 15.6 -10.64 10.1
GDP per capita ratio (source/US) -1.49 7.6 -2.55 5.7
Schooling years ratio (source/US) 0.69 3.0 1.11 3.1
Gini coeff. ratio (source/US) 2.54 5.8 5.83 5.3
Gini coeff. ratio (source/US) squared -1.16 6.3 -2.31 5.6
Share aged 15-29 in source pop. 0.52 0.7 4.09 2.8
Imm. Stock/source pop. (t-1) 7.18 3.4 8.43 4.2
Imm. Stock/source pop. (t-1) squared -39.70 4.1 -34.69 4.1
Distance -0.21 3.5 -0.24 2.5
Landlocked -0.46 1.7 -0.52 1.1
English speaking 1.63 6.4 2.01 4.1
Civil war 0.22 4.7 0.11 1.7
Eastern hemisphere, 1971-8 -0.32 9.3
Western hemisphere, 1971-8 -0.19 3.6 -0.19 3.8
IRCA 0.07 7.5 0.06 7.2
Dummy 1992-8 0.13 4.1 -0.10 1.8
Eastern Europe -0.12 0.3
Africa -2.00 5.0
Oceana 0.51 0.8




Central America 0.72 1.6 -0.51 0.8
South America 0.06 0.2 -0.98 1.3
Caribbean 1.33 2.6 -0.14 0.2
R
2  Time series 0.20 0.44
      Between countries 0.76 0.88
      Overall 0.71 0.84
No of observations 2268 61626
Table 9
Explaining deviations of the Average Latin American Immigration Rate to the US from that of Other Regions to
the US, 1971-1998
( contribution to the deviation in the log immigration rate ××××  100 )
Deviation of Latin America from:
Europe Africa Asia
Log immigration rate 171.4 316.7 183.0
GDP per capita ratio 50.7 -20.2 0.5
Schooling years ratio -17.8 13.8 -0.5
Inequality ratio 10.7 3.6 -1.1
Share aged 15-29 2.5 0.5 0.1
Immigrant stock/population 3.1 9.7 8.9
Distance 46.0 120.7 147.1
Landlocked 4.2 5.7 -1.7
English speaking 14.8 -75.1 -4.8
Civil war 2.3 0.6 -1.127
Table 10
Explaining Deviations from the Average Latin American Immigration Rate to the United States, 1971-1998







































Log immig rate 80.8 230.7 179.3 253.5 201.8 -16.9 114.4 8.4 34.1 37.6 64.3 -201.2 -126.6 -352.9 -137.3 -60.8 4.8 270.4 -214.1 -79.3 -386.7 -802.6
GDP per capita -30.0 -42.0 22.0 16.4 -80.6 2.3 25.4 20.4 34.4 27.3 6.1 -35.5 27.7 -4.6 -8.0 9.3 12.5 30.2 24.5 13.5 -17.1 -54.0
Schooling 1.5 30.0 -11.6 -8.9 15.2 0.9 -15.4 -25.4 -16.7 -17.4 14.9 20.9 -3.2 -15.9 12.9 -7.3 3.0 1.7 0.5 7.1 14.3 -1.3
Inequality 0.1 5.0 6.4 -6.1 -3.8 4.3 5.3 2.4 -10.6 4.4 3.2 -1.2 -4.2 -10.6 5.3 1.3 0.0 -5.2 1.5 -2.1 -0.5 5.1
Age 15-29 2.3 2.5 4.2 -0.9 4.0 5.6 -0.4 -4.0 -1.6 -1.1 1.6 -14.6 -3.4 3.5 1.0 6.5 0.8 9.7 0.6 1.0 -19.5 2.4
Immig stock 11.6 27.0 11.1 29.2 14.5 -4.9 11.6 -2.9 -2.8 3.3 6.7 -13.2 -12.4 -14.8 -12.5 -10.3 -5.7 14.7 -14.3 -11.4 -11.1 -13.5
Distance 55.9 20.7 46.7 53.1 17.8 35.7 46.0 48.1 47.1 41.9 31.8 -95.1 -41.8 -80.6 -84.1 16.7 6.8 4.2 -72.7 -25.0 -97.7 24.5
Landlocked 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 -47.3 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 -47.3 4.7 4.7 4.7
English -36.5 164.5 -36.5 164.5 164.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5 164.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5 -36.5
Civil war -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 4.4 2.4 -1.1 3.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 4.8 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 4.8 -1.1 -1.128
Table 11
Explaining Trends in Latin American Immigration Rates,
1971-1973 to 1996-1998











Mexico 29.7 1.8 21.9 32.6 19.4 30.7
Barbados -70.4 -1.3 -33.3 -0.3 -0.4 12.9
Dom. Rep. 26.1 -0.4 4.3 -6.4 8.5 31.5
Jamaica 6.8 24.2 8.1 -46.2 27.9 13.9
Trinidad -37.2 40.2 7.5 -23.4 0.7 34.3
Costa Rica -33.5 9.8 3.8 -9.0 -0.7 5.2
El Salvador 169.8 8.0 12.9 9.2 18.3 46.6
Guatemala 85.0 9.4 10.6 8.1 6.3 23.6
Honduras 96.9 6.0 15.4 68.1 12.0 16.6
Nicaragua 139.7 27.5 5.8 5.6 9.9 25.9
Panama -26.2 7.5 21.9 21.1 7.9 17.9
Argentina -37.5 25.5 7.7 -24.0 2.0 0.8
Bolivia 70.6 8.3 -4.1 -4.9 6.1 2.7
Brazil 91.2 -0.8 6.1 44.7 6.4 0.4
Chile -2.8 -10.5 3.2 1.1 -6.0 2.3
Colombia 32.3 -3.6 6.5 16.5 4.1 5.3
Equador -10.0 1.2 12.7 -13.7 13.1 9.6
Guyana 85.1 13.3 2.8 -28.8 22.4 -12.7
Paraquay 46.2 -0.3 7.7 1.5 1.7 1.1
Peru 148.0 19.2 16.0 15.5 12.8 6.0
Uruguay -47.7 1.4 0.9 -23.0 4.4 4.4






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cayman Islands                     
Puerto Rico                        
Virgin Islands                     
Barbados                           
Netherlands Antilles              
Cuba                               
Bahamas, The                       
Aruba                              
Haiti                              
Dominican Republic              
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines   
Saint Lucia                        
Antigua and Barbuda             
Jamaica                            
Suriname                           
Trinidad and Tobago             
Dominica                           
Saint Kitts and Nevis             
Guyana                             
Grenada                            
rates per 1000 population
1
9
9
5
-
9
9
1
9
9
0
-
9
4